Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law by Schwabach, Aaron
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law 
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives 
Faculty Scholarship 
2003 
Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law 
Aaron Schwabach 
University of Arkansas at Litle Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, aschwabach@ualr.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aaron Schwabach, Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law, 15 Law and Literature 1 (2003). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Bowen Law Repository: 
Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
Kosovo
VIRTUAL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Aaron Schwabach
Abstract. The z999 Kosovo conflict was seen as atypical in its objective and in its one-sidedness.
These qualities and the increasingly simulacral nature of modern warfare-war as entertainment-
deserve attention, but represent no fundamental change. However, grudging international accep-
tance of NA TO's "humanitarian intervention " may represent a change in the jus ad bellum. Three
sections consider (z) Jean Baudrillard's Eurocentric, Orientalist attempts to address similar issues;
(2) the ostensible objective of the war and the resulting effect on international law; and (3) the
asymmetry of the war. The conclusion contains observations about the future of the jus ad bellum.
INTRODUCTION: KOSOVO AND POSTMODERN WAR
It has become fashionable, if not especially enlightening, to refer to the 1999
Kosovo conflict as a postmodern war.' In these postmodern times, of course,
"postmodern" is an overworked adjective, meaning pretty much whatever the
user wants it to mean. Postmodernism is often confused, even by academics,
with post-structuralism, but the term enjoys greater currency as one of the
.cliches that arise at the intersection of popular culture and academia. As a
result, it has come to be applied to every field of human endeavor, including
one of the most primitive-war.
Most of the time, what lay users-that is, users outside the Modern Lan-
guage Association-seem to mean by "postmodern" is "different"; specifi-
cally, "different from other examples of the same thing in the last century or
so." Other wars, notably the Gulf War, have been declared "postmodern" as
well. But the objective of both sides in the Gulf War was a traditional one: to
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determine the territorial boundaries of two of the states involved and the sov-
ereignty of one of those two. The Kosovo war shared with the Gulf War the
characteristic of happening on television, in real time: war as entertainment.
The Kosovo war differed from the Gulf War, though, and from many previous
wars in at least two important respects: its objective and the lack of fatalities on
one side. This article explores whether these differences do, in fact, represent a
fundamental change in the nature of war and consequently in the international
law of war.
WAR AS ENTERTAINMENT: IF WE DON'T WATCH IT
ON TV, WILL PEOPLE STILL DIE?
Not long ago it seemed to most of the world that a war was taking place
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance of
European and North American states, and the country calling itself the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of two of the republics of the former
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). One of these republics, Serbia, domi-
nated the "Federation," and contained within it two territories, Kosovo and
Vojvodina, with populations of a different ethnic composition than that of
Serbia proper.' The cause of the war was the mistreatment of the Kosovar
Albanian population by the Serbian military and irregulars and the govern-
ment of Yugoslavia.
It has become popular among leftist critics of NATO's involvement to
claim that the war was "caused" by America's desire to build an oil pipeline
from the Caspian Sea (a body of water located very far away from Kosovo)
through Kosovo,3 or to award lucrative contracts to U.S. construction firms, or
to achieve any of a number of other increasingly unlikely-sounding goals.4
These things may or may not have been hidden motives for the involvement of
the various NATO states, but the very fact of their being so well hidden pre-
vents them from having been the cause of the war. Some apologists for
Milosevic, of course, go even further and claim that the ostensible cause of the
war did not actually exist, and that no mistreatment of Kosovo's population
had yet occurred, nor would it have occurred in the absence of NATO's
unprovoked belligerent acts.5
During and after the period of hostilities, I somehow found myself writing
several articles on the legality of the war6 and its effect on the further develop-
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ment of international law.' At some point during this period I also found time
to read Jean Baudrillard's silly book The Gulf War DidNot Take Place, which
had been sitting on my "things to get around to eventually" shelf for some
time.
At the time, I rejected Baudrillard's entire work as a waste of time and
money. After all, I had spent eleven dollars and ninety-five cents of my
employer's money, plus tax and shipping, to buy a copy, and it did not look like
good value for the money spent. The entire book is only eighty-seven pages
long, and the first quarter of it is taken up by an introduction by the translator;
Baudrillard's text amounts to about 63 full pages.' In addition, the text is
widely spaced, with extra blank lines between paragraphs; the entire effect
is similar to that created by an undergraduate student paper whose author,
through creative use of spacing, margins, and long words pulled from the
thesaurus has managed-barely-to stretch his or her paper to the three or
five pages requested by the professor.
In retrospect, I can see that my casual dismissal was an error, or at least con-
trary to my self-interest. If I had accepted Baudrillard's view at the time, I
could have saved myself the drudgery of writing all of those articles about
Kosovo; for surely if the Gulf War did not take place, the war in Kosovo did
not take place. Perhaps if I can convince myself at this point, I can at least spare
myself any future effort.
Without delving deeply into academic postmodernism and poststructural-
ism (and the practitioners thereof), it may be helpful to identify Baudrillard as
one of a group of French academics whose work has had a tremendous impact
on the English-speaking academic world. Like their counterparts in the United
States and elsewhere, many of these scholars have succeeded in becoming
identified with a particular word or phrase; that word or phrase in turn comes
to stand as a shorthand for the author's entire body of work. In some cases, the
word is an ordinary French word twisted into a sort of pun, like diffirance; in
others it might be a phrase that the user refuses to define or even to allow to be
translated, like objetpetit a. Baudrillard presents fewer problems of interpreta-
tion; his word is simulacrum (simulacre), which he uses in more or less the
same sense, albeit with more elaboration, that is ordinarily used."
Academics are often criticized for over-reliance on opaque jargon. In com-
parison to many of his compatriots and their American emulators, Baudrillard
indulges in jargon only sparingly. For the most part, he writes the most arrant
nonsense in a clear, readily accessible style. His basic point is that the Gulf
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War was not a war but the simulacrum of a war; it happened not on the battle-
field but on television. All of the traditional trappings of the buildup to war
were presented, even grotesquely exaggerated, on television; at the end, how-
ever, we (the audience) were deprived of the final battle, left with neither vic-
tory for the Allies nor defeat for Saddam Hussein.
In light of the bold promise of the book's title, this is rather disappointing.
Rather than arguing unequivocally that the entire war was a fraud perpetrated
upon the television-viewing public, Baudrillard is simply nattering on again
about simulacra. (At one point, though, he does suggest that "[o]ne is
reminded of Capricorn One," a movie about a government conspiracy to fake
a Mars landing in a film studio and present it to the public as news.)" Baudril-
lard, after all, is a man who, like his compatriot and predecessor Descartes,
spends an inordinate amount of time wondering whether he exists. Unlike
Descartes, however, he is not convinced that he exists merely because he
thinks that he does. His identity, and that of everything and everyone else, is
lost in a kaleidoscope of endlessly precessing simulacra that ultimately pre-
clude the existence of any baseline reality.
The Gulf War is not then real or unreal in any absolute sense, because there
is no ultimate "reality." It is simply less real than some things and more real
than others. (Baudrillard draws many comparisons between "events" in the
war and television commercials, for example.) The Gulf War (or simulacrum
of war) is thus at least as real as international law, and by extension so is the
Kosovo war; I shall therefore have to continue writing about all three.
Baudrillard begins by asserting that "It might have been supposed that the
defection of the Eastern Bloc would have opened up new spaces of freedom
for war by unlocking deterrence. Nothing of the sort." 2 Baudrillard, writing
these words at the beginning of I99I,'" was simply too impatient. As the world
has since learned to its dismay, the defection of the Eastern Bloc and subse-
quent breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened up a great
number of new spaces of freedom for war, most notably in the expression of
the ethnic conflicts previously repressed by authoritarian Communist regimes.
Baudrillard himself would undoubtedly deplore the idea that the facts of his
life might be responsible for his opinions. But his reactions on such topics as
America and superpower conflict (and, as we shall see later, Arabs and Islam)
are often surprisingly conventional for a person of his age, gender, and nation-
ality. Baudrillard was born in Reims in 1929. 1" He would thus have been three
or four years old when Hitler came to power, fifteen during the liberation
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of France, and sixteen when World War II ended. The bilateral Allied/Axis
conflict was almost immediately replaced with a similar conflict between the
more or less free-market countries of the West and the communist countries of
the Soviet bloc. As a result, it is perhaps natural that Baudrillard would see a
world with two opposing ideological camps as a prerequisite for war, or at
least for war of the sort to which he is accustomed. At the time of communism's
collapse, he found it difficult to believe in the possibility of war in a post-Soviet
world.
By the time Baudrillard opined that the collapse of the Eastern bloc had
opened up no new spaces of freedom for war, in fact, Croatia and Slovenia had
already begun to make secessionist noises; six months later the first of Yugo-
slavia's ethnic cleansing wars would begin. The Romanian revolution (or its
simulacrum) had already taken place, as Baudrillard repeatedly acknowl-
edges, after his fashion. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could have been designed
as a test case for the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world, as
the first major act of territorial aggression in which the response of the Soviet
Union (which itself would not last out the year) was more or less insignificant.
Thus, simulacrum or not, the Gulf War was important historically. Baudrillard
himself says, somewhat inconsistently in light of his other conclusions, that
"what is at stake in this one is war itself: its status, its meaning, its future." 6
Much of what strikes Baudrillard as different about the Gulf War, though, is
actually not new at all. For example, he sees the role of hostages as one of the
Gulf War's novel qualities: "The hostage has taken the place of the warrior.
He has become the principal actor, the simulacral protagonist, or rather, in his
pure inaction, the protagoniser of non-war." 7 Later, in Kosovo, the Serbian
government would make an entire civilian population hostage. Yet the use of
hostages in war, even on this scale, is hardly new; warring parties have always
viewed hostages "as exchange value and liquidity." 1 1 Using hostages as human
shields and bargaining chips is as old as war itself.
It is when Baudrillard likens the plight of the audience to the plight of the
hostages, though, that he begins to exhibit the indifference to human suffering
for which he has so often been criticized. 9 He writes that "all of us [are] infor-
mation hostages on the world media stage."0 . . . We are already all strategic
hostages in situ; our site is the screen on which we are virtually bombarded day
by day, even while serving as exchange value."'"
It is this element of the concept of simulacral war that is most difficult to
accept. The difference between the hostage and the viewer should be obvious
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even to one who affects to disbelieve in his own existence; the viewer can sim-
ply turn off the television and thus escape his or her predicament. Nor do the
viewers have significant "exchange value," unless the governments concerned
would discontinue the charade of war if they thought no one was watching, or
unless the simulacrum exists only to the degree it is perceived.
Thus the claim that "[t]he complement of the unconditional simulacrum in
the field is to train everyone in the unconditional reception of broadcast simu-
lacra" makes sense only if one also accepts that the simulacrum experienced by
the viewer is identical to that experienced by the viewed. Those who believe in
the reality of human suffering are likely to react to this idea with a certain
amount of hostility, however. This reaction can only be exacerbated by the
assertion that "it is [the hostages'] virtual death that is at issue, not their real
death. Moreover, they never die: at best they disappear. There will never be a
monument to the unknown hostage[;] everyone is too ashamed of him.. ."22
It is not merely the hostages that are unreal, of course, but the entire war:
"The war is also pure and speculative, to the extent that we do not see the real
event that it could be or that it would signify.
23
It would be easy, after reading such statements, to dismiss Baudrillard's
entire work as having no relevance to the development of international law.
He does, though, see a central role for international law in post-Soviet era
warfare, although he is apparendy not well-versed in the subject. "It is the de-
intensified state of war, that of the right to war under the green light of the UN
and with an abundance of precautions and conditions. It is the bellicose equiv-
alent of safe sex: make war like love with a condom!
24
In addition, "[t]he Gulf War is the first consensual war, the first war con-
ducted legally and globally with a view to putting an end to war and liquidat-
ing any confrontation likely to threaten the henceforward unified system of
control." 25 Notwithstanding that some unreconstructed (or undeconstructed)
modernist historians may have thought that World War I was the first such
war, Baudrillard is correct about the increased role of international law and
international legal structures (including NATO and the Security Council) in
post-Cold War conflicts. Baudrillard does not distinguish between the Secu-
rity Council and other organs of the United Nations, and apparendy has noth-
ing to say on the topic of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.26 It is true, though,
that the Gulf War was the first war carried out under the authority of a Secu-
rity Council resolution and thus arguably the first war since the initiation of
the Security Council regime to be unequivocally legal, since assertions of self-
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defense inevitably involve disputed facts. In fact, it is the absence of the Secu-
rity Council's "green light" (at best, the Security Council provided an amber
light) that casts doubt on the legality of NATO's war against Yugoslavia.
In assessing the underlying cause of the war, Baudrillard is again inconsis-
tent. On the one hand, the war is meaningless: "the absence of politics pursued
by other means."2 (Here Baudrillard acknowledges Clausewitz but not Fou-
cault's inversion of Clausewitz, that politics is war continued by other means.)"
On the other hand, "[t]he crucial stake, the decisive stake in this whole affair is
the consensual reduction of Islam to the global order."29 While many might
question whether this was in fact the purpose of the war, it is surely a political
objective. (Earlier, of course, Baudrillard had opined that what was at stake
was not the fate of Islam, but of "war itself.")" The identification of this pur-
pose, though, seems to be part of Baudrillard's continuing identification of
Islam with the Other. Early in the piece he comments that Iran and Iraq are
nations of "savages."3 Although his tone here and throughout the piece is
arch and scornful, and was probably meant to be taken as mocking those who
think of Iranians and Iraqis as savages, the repetitions are too frequent to be
ignored. He refers to "the virulent and ungraspable instability of the Arabs
and of Islam, whose defense is that of the hysteric in all his versatility," 32 and to
"the Oriental logic of Saddam."33
The word "Oriental" in this context has an odd ring to American ears. To
Americans "Oriental" is an outmoded term once used to refer to the coun-
tries, cultures, inhabitants, and artifacts of East Asia. To Europeans in general,
however, and to the French in particular, the term refers to what Americans
generally still refer to as the Middle East. And to academics everywhere the
word inevitably suggests the work of Edward Said.34
Orientalism was at one time the term used in European universities for the
study of the countries of the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, South and East
Asia. The European "Orientalists"-writers and academics--created an
image of the "Orient" in the European popular consciousness bearing only
occasional resemblance to the original: a perfect Baudrillardian simulacrum
except for the fact that it was largely constructed before the days of television,
relying almost exclusively on the medium of print. Said uses the term "Orien-
talism" to refer not only to the academic discipline but also to the simulacral
Orient created by it: a textual Orient.35 He describes the creations of the Ori-
entalists as "highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what
a live Orient might be thought to look like."36
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To an American, perhaps, it may seem especially bizarre that a resident of
France would repeatedly insist on the Otherness of Arabs and Islam.37 France,
after all, is a diverse and pluralistic democracy with nearly two million Mus-
lims among its fifty-nine million inhabitants." In 1992, 1.72 million Muslims
lived in France, making Muslims more than twice as numerous there as Prot-
estants;39 this number included 614,207 Algerians and 572,652 Moroccans."
Many of these persons, of course, are French citizens. Perhaps it is these he is
thinking of when he says, "The Arabs: there where they should not be (immi-
grants) . . ." To a resident of a country where even conservative standard-
bearers extol the benefits of immigration4' it may be difficult to understand the
assumption that immigrants "should not be" there.42 On the other hand, my
bafflement and, indeed, disgust at the racism contained in this assumption may
only prove Baudrillard's point that "[Tihe Americans... cannot imagine the
Other, nor therefore personally make war upon it." 43 In this thought Baudril-
lard echoes the earlier words of Said: "Unlike the Americans, the French and
the British... have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling Orientalism,
a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special
place in European Western experience."' The Orient, Said concludes, is the
source of one of Europe's "deepest and most recurring images of the Other.
'4
It does not hold a similar place in the American worldview. Baudrillard,
however, is unable to free himself from the Orientalism his culture has incul-
cated in him, and therefore is insistent on the Otherness of Arabs and Islam.
He conflates the two terms, and draws no distinction between largely Arab
Iraq and non-Arab Iran. The goal of the West is to meet "the challenge of
Islam, with its irreducible and dangerous alterity." The "refractory forces on
the planet" include "Islam in its entirety."47 Of course, Baudrillard apparently
disapproves of these aims, and of those who would see Islam as the Other. But
the mere fact that he imputes this belief to others suggests that he sees Islam in
this way-as Other in its entirety-and tells us more about the author than
about those he addresses.
From an American perspective, at least, this insistence is bizarre. Baudril-
lard's "uncontrollable elements" include, among others, the 1.72 million Mus-
lims of France, many of whom must be Mr. Baudrillard's neighbors, col-
leagues and, at one time, students. Many, born in France, are every bit as
French as Mr. Baudrillard himself.4"
Throughout this work, as indeed in all his work, Baudrillard affects an air of
cynical detachment, as if prepared to sneer at any reader foolish enough to
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take him seriously or to believe that he actually means the outrageous things
that he says. But racism, even affected racism, causes real damage. Baudrillard,
despite his rejection of everything up to and including reality, is evidently a
product of his time and his culture: As Said points out, France has played a
greater role than any country (with the possible exception of the United King-
dom) in the development of Orientalism.49
But Islam and its adherents are not the only Others here. The Americans,
those "missionar[ies] bearing electroshocks"50 serve equally as signifiers or at
least exemplars of everything that is un-French. Seen in this way, the book
becomes nothing more than the curmudgeonly and xenophobic rant of a
cranky old French person dismayed to find his country embroiled in a conflict
between two equally despised sets of foreigners.
Baudrillard's unquestioning acceptance of a Eurocentric and even racist
value system is not all that surprising in light of the obvious consequences of
his thinking. An obvious extension of the argument that the Gulf War did not
take place, or did not take place in any meaningful way, is that the Holocaust
did not take place, nor did the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda or the Balkans.
The latter two had not occurred at the time of Baudrillard's writing, of course.
The former, though, was an outgrowth of the same intellectual tradition as
Baudrillard's self-conscious bourgeois nihilism; Pol Pot (then Saloth Sar) and
Sary Ieng (then Kim Trang) acquired much of their ideology, including
Andre Malraux's doctrine of necessary violence, at the Sorbonne.5'
It would be unkind to conclude from this that the principal export of French
universities is bad ideas. It might be even less kind to expand upon this idea,
taking colonialism, communism, fascism, Orientalism and various other isms
into account, and conclude that the principal export of Europe is bad ideas.
It thus comes as something of a relief to find that some of Baudrillard's
numerous critics consider that he has nothing of value to contribute:
In fact, his thought does not develop at all. He is simply an aphorist who seized
upon half a dozen borrowed concepts twenty-odd years ago and has rung
changes on them ever since. Thus it is both frustrating and deceptive to seek
progressive modulations between one text and another. They are all basically
one book, and any fifty consecutive pages of Baudrillard are essentially the
whole of Baudrillard.
52
More recently, the United States has found itself involved in a postmodern
conflict of another sort: One in which there is no clearly defined "enemy." For
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most of us, the war is defined by simulacra: the videos, endlessly repeated, of
the hijacked airliner crashing into the south tower of the World Trade Center,
and the videos of the towers collapsing. We have seen these images so many
times, woven into so many different commentaries (each a creative work in
itself) in so many media, that the original event may be difficult to distinguish
from the precessing simulacra. But it is not impossible to distinguish. To dis-
miss the underlying reality (and horror) of the event, as Baudrillard does with
the Gulf War, is facile, meaningless, and morally empty. Real people died; real
people continue to suffer as a result.
The concept of simulacrum is useful for understanding the relationship
between events and experience, but simulacra, even those generated by a sin-
gle event, are not necessarily symmetrical. Simulacral or not, the experience
of war by TV viewers is not the same as the experience of war by its partici-
pants and victims. While the war may not have taken place for Jean Baudril-
lard, and even less so for me, for example (I didn't even watch it on television),
it definitely took place for the Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Palestinians, Saudi Arabians,
Israelis, Americans, Europeans and others involved.
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WAR:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF STATES
The Kosovo war was the first war in which states declared war on another
state specifically to protect the human rights of subjects of that state. In doing
so, the NATO states broke with existing international law and ventured into
territory previously the exclusive domain of academics and some human-
rights activists: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.53
The human rights of subject populations have been a concern of warring
states since at least the time of the American Civil War. Until the Kosovo war,
however, international law had recognized no right to go to war to protect
human rights, or to intervene militarily in the domestic human-rights prac-
tices of another state. The modern doctrine governing the use of force is set
forth in the United Nations Charter, which states that "[aill Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." 4 Only two
exceptions are permitted: States may use force in self-defense 5 or where
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authorized by the Security Council.56 The Charter contains no right of
humanitarian intervention, and specifically prohibits the United Nations from
intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state," although "this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII."57
Unlike the Gulf War, the Kosovo War took place without a green light
from the Security Council. While the Security Council was "[d]eeply alarmed
and concerned at the continuing grave humanitarian situation throughout
Kosovo and the impending humanitarian catastrophe,"" the certainty of a
Russian or Chinese veto prevented it from authorizing the use of military
force.59 The NATO states claimed that their action did not violate article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter because it was implicitly authorized by Security
Council Resolutions 1160,60 1199,61 and 1203.62 Surprisingly, they placed less
emphasis on the traditionally popular doctrine of collective self-defense, per-
haps because the self-defense in this instance was anticipatory.63 All were
united, however, in agreeing that the war was undertaken to protect the
human rights of the Kosovar Albanian minority.' 4 At least one of the NATO
states, Belgium, argued that the war was justified as a humanitarian interven-
tion even if not otherwise permitted by the Charter, because NATO's action
was "not an intervention against the territorial integrity or independence of
the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose of NATO's intervention
[was] to rescue a people in peril, in deep distress .... [This was] an armed
humanitarian intervention, compatible with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter, which covers only intervention against the territorial integrity of
political independence of a State."
65
At the outset of the war, NATO's actions almost certainly violated existing
normative expectations about the behavior of states.66 Events since the war,
however, have shown a high degree of tolerance of NATO's conduct, even by
those states most opposed to the war. Ultimately, an answer to the question of
the legality of humanitarian intervention must await the resolution of the eight
cases still pending against NATO members before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). 61 Of course, the ICJ may well dodge that question. There
remains, however, Security Council Resolution 1244, which in effect retro-
actively endorses NATO's actions.61 Barring future developments to the con-
trary in the ICJ, it appears that a normative expectation permitting armed
intervention to protect human rights, or at least to prevent genocide or ethnic
cleansing, is in the process of being formed. Although it cannot yet be said
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with certainty that humanitarian intervention is legal, it can no longer be said
with certainty that international law prohibits humanitarian intervention in
the domestic affairs of a state.
WAR WITHOUT. TEARS: KOSOVO AS A VIRTUAL WAR
Baudrillard calls the Gulf War a "virtual war,"69 a term that turns up again as
the tide of Michael Ignatieff's book on the Kosovo war.70 It is this aspect of the
war that has particularly captured the popular imagination: More than 5,ooo
Yugoslav soldiers and about 5oo civilians were killed by NATO forces.7' An
unknown number of Serbian irregulars and KLA guerillas were killed in fight-
ing on the ground. An unknown but probably larger number of Kosovar
Albanian civilians were murdered by Serbs. Women were imprisoned, and
often killed, in rape camps at Djakovica and Pecs.72 Property was looted,
homes were burned, nearly the entire population of Kosovo was left homeless.
In short, war was hell-but only for the people on the ground.
In the first sentence of the chapter titled "Virtual War" in his book of the
same name, Michael Ignatieff observes that NATO forces made it through the
Kosovo war without a single combat fatality.73 To many observers, it seems as
if the war must have been no more than a video game to the NATO soldiers;
they, like the TV watchers back in Paris and Chicago, experienced the war as
a simulacrum. The concern of the observers seems to be that war without risk
just isn't sporting. Ignatieff writes that NATO observed especially strict
rules of engagement, and "presented these rules-which tried to limit civil-
ian casualties-as a sign of moral superiority. But one could argue that their
real purpose was to assuage NATO's unease about its own impunity."74 He
then goes on to observe that the effect of lower NATO casualties was probably
lower Yugoslavian casualties as well; had NATO suffered losses, it might have
responded more savagely.
Ignatieff is better informed and more consistent than Baudrillard. Yet even
while applauding the relatively low loss of life in the Kosovo conflict, its one-
sidedness disturbs him: "[H]ere we have.. .violence which moralizes itself as
justice and which is unrestrained by consequences."7 In this he echoes Baud-
rillard, and is in turn echoed by others who consider the disproportionate
numbers of casualties.
Disproportionate casualties are nothing new, though. Whenever levels of
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technology or military strength are widely disparate, as they were in Kosovo,
the weaker side will suffer much greater losses; occasionally the stronger side
suffers none at all. The losses on both sides tend to be far greater when
strengths are approximately evenly matched, as in World War I.
The main factor that kept NATO casualties low was distance. NATO
weapons could strike at targets while the operators of those weapons remained
safely out of sight and out of reach. As technology advances, this insulation of
the soldier from the battlefield will also increase. Eventually it may become
possible for soldiers to operate weapons while remaining safely hundreds of
miles away from the "battlefield"-a term that is itself already archaic-
making the video-game war a reality, at least for one side.
This has already begun to happen: in the recent war in Afghanistan, Amer-
ican forces used remotely-controlled spy aircraft that had been outfitted with
weapons.76 This spectacle-robots armed with missiles firing on villagers
armed with rifles-is a common theme in science fiction, which Brian McHale
has called "the ontological genre par excellence," adding "science fiction [is]
Postmodernism's non-canonized or 'low art' double."" Although this theme
has attained the status of a cliche, one carefully-developed depiction is that in
Joe Haldeman's novel Forever Peace.78 The story's protagonist, Julian Class, is
a University of Texas professor and U.S. Army sergeant who spends ten days
each month remotely operating a military robot metonymically (and ironi-
cally) called a soldierboy. Together Class and the soldierboy form a cyborg-
a concept often linked in fiction and criticism with problems of identity.79
Class, in the person of the soldierboy, fights against third-world guerrillas
who, unlike him, are actually present. In one disturbing scene, he and his fel-
low soldiers discuss having killed two ten-year-old girls who fired upon the
soldierboys ° The girls could not have inflicted serious damage on the robots,
and, of course, could not have injured Class or his fellow operators, who were
far away and safe at the time.
The scene could have been written in response to Baudrillard's solipsistic
view of virtual war as nothing more than non-intersecting simulacra-for
Baudrillard, the simulacral war that the "Americans" experienced never mir-
rored that experienced by Saddam Hussein: "[T]he two adversaries did not
even confront each other face to face, the one lost in its virtual war won in
advance, the other buried in its traditional war lost in advance.""' Haldeman's
reader, however, is left with the horrified awareness that, while Class's war is
a simulacrum, the little girls' deaths are real. Inhabiting worlds of simulacra is
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a luxury enjoyed by academics from wealthy countries, like Jean Baudrillard
and Julian Class, one of whom may be no more and no less real than the other.
Those who actually risk death in war, though, enjoy no such luxury, but must
believe in the reality of war and their own existence.
AFTER THE VIRTUAL WAR IS OVER:
THE FUTURE OF WAR
Was the Kosovo conflict, then, a "postmodern" war? It was, as all future wars
are likely to be, simulacral, or at least televised. The casualties were one-sided,
but that has always been and will always be the case when one warring party
enjoys a significant technological or strategic advantage and values the lives of
its own troops. The one way in which it differed significantly from all previous
wars was in its stated objective.
Other observers also see the inconclusiveness of the war as a departure
from past practice. To Baudrillard, the Americans needed to "hallucinat[e]"
Iraq "to be a threat of comparable size to themselves: otherwise they would
not even have been able to believe in their own victory." 2 A virtual victory
was no victory at all: In the end, Saddam Hussein remained in power, and thus
the "Americans" did not achieve victory,83 the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from
Kuwait apparently not being a significant result. "The minimal losses of the
coalition pose a serious problem, which never arose in any earlier war."" The
invasions of Grenada and Panama-the latter concluded just as Baudrillard
began to write-apparently do not count. Nor does the Spanish-American
war, in which the greatest hazard to American troops was the canned meat
with which they were supplied, nor do any number of Indian wars. Nor do the
European colonial wars in which warriors armed only with spears confronted
Europeans armed with machine guns. Apparently only more allied deaths
could have made the war real, for "a war without victims does not seem like a
real war..."85 The deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqis (Baudrillard himself
sets the figure at ioo,ooo 5)-for that matter, the deaths of the Kuwaitis whose
country was invaded-were not enough to make the war real.
Ignatieff sees the same problem from a different perspective:
Virtual war proceeds to virtual victory. Since the means employed are limited,
the ends achieved are equally constrained: not unconditional surrender, regime
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change or destruction of the war-making capacity of the other side, only an
ambiguous "end state." Instead of Serb surrender, the NATO alliance con-
tented itself with a "military technical agreement" which . . . left entirely
undefined the juridical status of the territory over which the war was fought. 7
This problem may not actually exist, however, or at least it may not be a
new phenomenon. The assumption that the ends achieved in the Kosovo war
were "constrained" because "the means employed [were] limited" seems to
overlook history. Ambiguous endings to wars are probably more common
than any other sort. For example, in high school I learned that the United
States (and, of course, its allies, including South Korea) "won" the Korean
war, after a protracted conflict with enormous loss of life on all sides. It was
only later that I questioned how an ending that left both states in control of
more or less the same territory as before the war, and left Kim I1 Sung in power
in Pyongyang, might be termed a victory.
Yet the continuing division of the Korean peninsula is itself but one of the
many ambiguities and unresolved conflicts left scattered about the globe by
World War II. For example Germany, one of the major villains of that conflict,
remained a divided country (and Berlin a divided city) until i99i , after Ger-
many reunified and the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to
Germany (between Germany and the World War II Allies) entered into force.88
Ambiguous endings have been a feature of American warfare at least since
the War of 1812. Elsewhere in the world, Israel's wars with its neighbors have
for the most part ended inconclusively, without resolving "the juridical status
of the territory over which the war was fought." Such defined international
borders as Israel possesses are the result of lengthy negotiations during peace-
time, years or decades after the wars with those particular neighbors have
ended. More recent conventional wars, such as those between Iran and Iraq or
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, have also ended inconclusively. Civil wars have
proved similarly ambiguous; sometimes, as in Cyprus, the ambiguity persists
for long enough to acquire its own quality of permanence.
Virtual or simulacral war thus has no monopoly on the ambiguous ending.
Nor was the ending of the Kosovo war particularly ambiguous. The inaccu-
racy contained -in the statement that the end of the war "left entirely undefined
the juridical status of the territory over which the war was fought" makes the
ending appear more ambiguous than it actually was. The war was not fought
over territory; none of the NATO members has territorial aspirations in
Kosovo. The war was fought to protect the Kosovar Albanian population
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from oppression and expulsion. Once the Serb forces left Kosovo, the agent of
oppression was removed. Once the refugees were able to return to their
homes (or the places where there homes had been), most did so. (Similarly, the
goal of the Gulf War was not to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but to
remove the Iraqi army from Kuwait.)
Finally, the "juridical status" of Kosovo is somewhat uncertain, but that
uncertainty seems to result more from the deliberative processes of the United
Nations than from any actions of NATO or Yugoslavia itself. The first source
of uncertainty is the ICJ, which has not yet been able to bring itself to address
the related questions of Yugoslavia's membership in the United Nations and
its sovereignty over Kosovo.89 The second is the General Assembly, whose
refusal to seat the Yugoslav delegation at the time of the Kosovo war left open
the question of Belgrade's sovereignty over all of the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
The third is the Security Council: Resolution 1244 claims to reaffirm "the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of" Yugoslavia, yet it has the effect of terminating Yugoslavian sovereignty
over Kosovo.90 Part of the reason for this waffling was the extremely conserva-
tive approach the UN has always taken to questions of territorial sovereignty.
Another was pragmatic: As Ignatieff observes, Western Europe and the
United States wish to impose their values upon Kosovo "without the burdens
of actual occupation."9 Neither NATO nor the UN wishes to govern Kosovo;
however, it was demonstrably unacceptable to return the province to the rule
of Milosevic. The emergence of a stable, pluralistic Yugoslavian democracy
would enable NATO and the UN to return Kosovo to Belgrade's rule with a
clean conscience. To the extent that such a democracy has emerged since the
Kosovo war, it has actually dimmed Kosovar Albanian hopes for indepen-
dence, while signs of Montenegro's impending secession must strengthen
them. Ironically, Kosovo would be far closer to independence now had an
intransigent and irredentist Milosevic remained in power. If the fledgling
Yugoslavian democracy succeeds, it seems unlikely that Western nations will
support independence for Kosovo-a result that can only be seen as betrayal
by the Kosovar Albanians.
Regrettably, war is an old and apparently durable human institution. If
Kosovo represents a fundamental change in the nature of war, that change can
only be in the legality of war fought to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.
The probable emergence of a normative expectation permitting humanitarian
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intervention may have encouraged the current administration to continue test-
ing the bounds of thejus ad bellum (law pertaining to the use of force). Its cur-
rent stance on war with Iraq invokes the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense,
an idea with roots far more ancient than the UN Charter but with nearly as
uncertain a modern footing as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.92
If the objective of the Kosovo war was novel, however, the one-sidedness
of the loss of life was not. The Kosovo war thus represented no fundamental
change in thejus in bello (the law pertaining to the conduct of armed conflicts).
It may, however, have ushered in a fundamental change in the nature of thejus
ad bellum: the apparently emerging legality of the use of armed force to pre-
vent a humanitarian catastrophe within the territory of another state.
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